



**Report of the Vision 2020
National Technical Working Groups
On
Security**



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1.0 Introduction

1.1. Overview of the Security Thematic Area

Security is conceptualized as the actual or potential freedom and safety from physical/military, political, economic, socio-cultural or psychological danger or attack. That is, it is the protection or defense of people against all kinds of victimization from external/military attack, economic want, poverty, illiteracy, disease/ill-health, political oppression, social exploitation, criminality, etc. And it is perceived in terms of the generality of the population i.e. the physical, political, economic, and social security of the average citizen rather than that of the government of the day and its officials.

By implication, security is the condition which enhances the ability of government, its agencies, and its citizens to function without let or hindrance. Differently put, it implies the absence of threat to limb, life, and property; encompasses the socio-economic well-being of the people; and enables co-existence in peace and harmony. Section 14 [1] b of Chapter 2 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria captures the importance of security when it states that “security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of Government. Seen this way, security is a social contract between the state and its citizens in which the former is expected to protect, defend, and provide for the latter in the public arena.

Prior to the 2004 NEEDS 1, the approach of Government to the issue of security over the decades has been narrow, compartmentalized, and constrained by a statist and “law-and-order” conception. While external threat to the country’s security has been only potential, or minimal at the worst, the level of internal security has been less than optimum. Apart from the impact of massive and widespread corruption on the economic, political and social security of the country as a polity and the dislocations occasioned by periodic ethno-religious strife, the direct cost and consequences of insecurity in the population have been manifold. For instance, in addition to the material loss and/or personal distress caused by actual criminal victimization to the citizens, the credibility of the Nigerian State itself in providing for the security of life and property of the population has been called into question on occasions.



With the advent of NEEDS 1 came a realization or recognition of the shortcoming of governmental approach and responses hitherto. Policies and measures were enunciated to mitigate many of the root policy and operational causes of insecurity and re-orient and enable security agencies and instrumentalities to be more effective and efficient – and thereby improve the security situation in the country. Conceptually and operationally, NEEDS 1 put forth what should have amounted to a paradigmatic shift, were they faithfully implemented.

Unfortunately, most of the NEEDS 1 policies and measures in relation to security are still to be implemented – excepting for “isolated” activities, here and there, in this or that agency, and in an un-informed and un-coordinated manner e.g. increase in the number of policemen without regard to their quality or transparency in the process of their selection. Thus, the situation of security remains essentially unchanged. Even if we discount the exceptional situation in the Niger-Delta region and the time-bound politics/elections – related violence and associated criminality, the assessment is still that there is widespread feeling of insecurity and fear of crime among the generality of the citizens. Consequently, there remains certain fundamental issues and challenges for address if the level of security in the country is to be improved in the coming years and decade.

1.2. Scope of the Security Thematic Area

The following are covered in the context of visioning the matter of security in the country towards 2020 and beyond.

- Appropriate conceptualization of security;
- Identification of developmental, human and material factors/variables that determine the level of effectiveness and efficiency of security;
- Description and assessment of the current situation of security in the country;
- Consideration and assessment of the structure, organization, and functioning of the governmental agencies and instrumentalities in charge of security;
- Accounting for the observed current situation of security in the country, applying the factors/variables earlier identified;



- Identification of key issues and challenges perennially and currently facing the security-scene in the country;
- Outlining strategic imperatives for the optimum success of the security sector in the coming years towards 2020; and
- Visioning for the security sector, along with associated policies and measures, programmes and activities, and periodized implementation plans.

1.3. Overall Targets for the Security Thematic Area

Towards 2020, the targets to be achieved, through the implementation of the policies, measures, programmes, and activities to be outlined include the following:

- Appropriate clarification and delimitation of roles of the various law-enforcement and security agencies to minimize duplication and associated problems.
- Enhanced role of intelligence (internal and external) and improvement of its quality;
- Improvement on our current level of external security;
- Significant reduction in the quantum and quality of criminality and civil strife; and
- Significant improvement in actual security, and feeling of security, among the generality of the population in most places and most of the time;

1.4. Process Involved in Developing the Plan for the Security Thematic Area

In developing this Plan to date, the following have applied, and will apply subsequently:

- Meetings of the Working Group to interactively identify, discuss and reach decisions on both substantive and operational issues;
- Sourcing and studying of literature, documents, and data by Members;
- Assignments of specific task to members and sub-groups of the Working Group [e.g. general/internal security, defence, and intelligence sub-region];



- Usage of Members' knowledge, expertise, and experience in the matter of security;
- Interactive sessions with Service Chiefs and Chief Executives of Security, Intelligence and paramilitary agencies as well as those of relevant Ministries (e.g. Defence and Interior);
- Interface sessions with certain other thematic groups (e.g. Judiciary & Rule of Law, ICT, Governance and Foreign Policy); and
- "Plenary" consideration of sub-group submissions and production of an overall report.



2.0 Current Assessment of the Security Thematic Area

In the overview presented in 1.1 above, an assessment of our current security situation has been summarily indicated. Here, that indication is further highlighted for purpose of required elaboration.

Even though Nigeria is potentially not immune from geo-political configurations, events and happenings around the world, particularly in our sub-region, external threats to the country's security have been virtually non-existent, minimal, or only in the realm of potentiality. That is, like many other countries, large or small/rich or poor, the country's security is affected, at least latently, by globalization, terrorism, religious fanaticism, sea piracy, toxic waste dumping, separatist/secessionist tendencies, melting-down of dominant economies along with the collapse of their financial institutions, etc. The point is that, inspite of these, Nigeria's external security situation has been optimum – excepting for the organized-crime-related “contributions” to the problematic situation in the Niger-Delta region [e.g. infusion of laundered money, provision of arms/ammunitions, oil-bunkering, etc], our dependence on foreign military supplies, and the inadequate monitoring of our porous borders.

In terms of the gathering and usage of intelligence to enhance our security, the responsible agencies appear to be performing, especially when gauged in terms of our continued dominance of our West African sub-region and the mitigation of threats posed by transnational organized crimes and competing interests across the countries of the region. Perhaps, it is only in the area of the overall leadership of our intelligence apparatus that a persisting problem exists: the law-enforcement orientation of the holders of the office overtime, instead of required appropriate orientation that emphasizes broad and strategic knowledge of the world and the place and interests of the country therein.

However, it is in the very important area of internal or domestic security that the situation has been critical and remains critical. On zonal basis, there is the Niger-Delta near-insurgency. At the community level, there is the periodic but regular ethno-religious strife in various parts of the country [e.g. Kano, Osun, Kaduna, Benue/Taraba, Bauchi, Plateau, etc], always with significant loss of lives and property, as well as social dislocations among the affected population. And there is also the anarchy and criminal violence and disorders associated with periodic elections [e.g. 2003, 2007, 2009]. Perhaps needless to say, the



communal-level strife and disorder result from failure of intelligence on domestic security in terms of adequacy, promptness, or even quality/truthfulness.

Still, the greatest indication of the dire situation of our internal security is the existence of what is referred to in criminological literature as a “CRIME PROBLEM” i.e. when in terms of incidence/prevalence, seriousness/quality, and recalcitrance to prevention and control, crime passes from the normal or tolerable level to the pathological and becomes a “social problem”, having become inter-twined with the social fabric and involving virtually every social and occupational category in the population [depending on the opportunities offered by their occupational and social status in the society].

Thus, with implications for people security, as well as their feeling of security, the criminality-scene in the country is littered with assorted kinds of common theft, burglary, cheating, petty fraud in the markets and other work-places; crimes of violence such as aggravated assault, thuggery, assassinations, kidnappings; economy-and-polity-damaging elite and leadership offences such as corruption, embezzlement, large-scale fraud, money-laundering, election-rigging; organized crime such as smuggling, oil-bunkering, arms smuggling, pipeline vandalisation, human-trafficking, cyber-crime; and the usually-unattended crimes of indiscipline and lack of law-abidingness best epitomized by the conduct of our vehicular road-users.

Differently stated, crime continues to be on the increase, both in terms of volume and seriousness; the amount and quality of protection the police offers the citizens as a whole and the degree of confidence and cooperation it enjoys from the average citizen continue to be far less than optimum; courts still delay and, therefore, deny justice in the majority of cases as the police are usually “still investigating” and the poorly-paid prosecuting state-counsels or police officers are usually asking for adjournments; and court-sentences for convicts appear to have no corrective effect in most cases as the prisons regularly receive back about one-third (1/3) of those they had allegedly “corrected” and released, and as many prisons are usually over-crowded by not less than a hundred percent with those “on remand awaiting trial”.

Four of the certain but enduring features of our crime prevention and control system which default its security-enhancing role need highlighting. One, the



inappropriateness/inadequacies of many of the colonially-inherited laws [especially the procedural laws] can only frustrate and sabotage [and they do actually frustrate and sabotage] the security-enhancing objective of the criminal justice administration system. Two, the system is characterized by a pattern of contradictions – and a good example of this is the fact that even though elite crimes, such as corruption/money laundering/election rigging, are most destructive of the security of the entity known as Nigeria, it is common offences that usually lead to arrest, prosecution, and severe sanctions as “exemplary” deterrent lessons.

Three, system [excepting the Prisons Service] lack rich/informative, valid and reliable data, appropriately collected, collated, and analyzed for requisite knowledge, projection and planning against criminality and, by implication, enhancement of security. This failure by the generic instrumentality [i.e. the Police] extends to the courts which administer criminal justice. Without such data, how can the system determine “best practices” to enhance security? And four, the non-operation of the four-major instrumentalities of crime prevention/control as interconnected and interdependent “system” as well as limited information-sharing collaboration among the various law-enforcement and security agencies is another counter productive feature.

Summarily, the assessment of the current status of internal security is that conventional and specific government and public efforts to enhance security through prevention/control of crime have, largely and systematically, been unsuccessful, over the years, occasional episodic “successes” in gun-battles with armed robbers or smugglers notwithstanding. It is this situation of low level of security, and resultant feeling of insecurity in the population, that is responsible for the current proliferation of informal vigilante groups and formal private-guard security companies in the country.

A noteworthy exception to the security-defaulting crime prevention/control situation that has been described is the functioning and output of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and, to a lesser extent, the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Crime Commission. That is, they have been contributing to the enhancement of the nation’s economic and financial security.



2.1. Global Trends on the Security Thematic Area

Historically and contemporaneously, all nations have varying security problems of varying magnitude for varying reasons and which they confront variously according to their human and material resources and capability. However, since the collapse of the Soviet empire, the cessation of ideological [and potential military] conflict between the two major power blocks, and the infamous September 11 attack on the commercial and military nerve centres [as well as the national ego] of the USA, one dominant response-trend on the security issue has been one of increased emphasis on intelligence, especially human and routinely-gathered and agencies-shared intelligence. The establishment of an Homeland Security Department by the USA epitomizes this trend and emphasis as it already had sixteen [16] intelligence outfits in existence.

This trend is in response to the emergent security threats around the globe – whether in the USA, Latin America, Europe, South-East Asia, the Middle-East, the Indian/Pakistan sub-continent, Africa [especially the Northern and Eastern regions] – which include the following

- Terrorism and suicide-bombers;
- Religious fundamentalism, fanaticism and associated conflicts;
- Hostage-taking, kidnappings and assassinations;
- Small arms smuggling and proliferation;
- Human-trafficking;
- Drug trafficking;
- Corruption and money laundering;
- Illegal toxic-waste dumping
- Oil bunkering;
- Sea piracy;
- Separatist/secessionist organizations;



- Imbalance in the distribution, allocation and/or consumption of crucial resources [e.g. oil, gas, precious metals];
- Poverty and Hunger
- Dictatorship and/or bad governance which creates internal turmoil that spread to neighbouring countries.

In addition to this global trend towards an increase appreciation of the role of intelligence, enabled with qualitative agencies and staffed by well-trained and patriotic personnel, other trends are discernible:

- Increased funding for training, re-training of law enforcement and security personnel;
- Increased funding for surveillance, operational, and other facilities for effective/efficient functioning;
- Increased funding for Research and Development of innovative security techniques and technologies;
- Upgrading of the role of the Air-Forces among the defence and security forces to enhance their capability and readiness in a globalised and digital world;
- Pointed response to the crimes of corruption, money laundering and other forms of organized crime with international, regional and bilateral instruments of cooperation to ensure punishment for offenders as well as the forfeiture ill-gotten wealth;
- Community-oriented and service-directed policing and law-enforcement;
- Respect for human-rights in all areas of citizen-life, but especially in the administration of criminal justice;
- Quickened dispensation of justice through introduction of alternative modes of arbitration or processing;



- Victim-recognizing justice system with provisions for victim-remedies, such as compensation and restitution;
- Decongestion of prisons through provisions for sentences of warning, community-labour/service, suspended sentence, payment of fines by installment, probation, parole, halfway houses.

2.1.1. Comparative Benchmarking Analysis

There are some developed countries of the West [e.g the UK and the USA] against which Nigeria's security can be compared because of historical relationship, similarity of ideology for economic and social development, existing trade/development/strategic relations and, importantly, similarity in the system of criminal justice administration. Again, Nigeria's security situation can be benchmarked against certain other "middle-income" nations like herself e.g. Egypt, South Africa, Ghana, Senegal, Brazil, Venezuela, Columbia, India, Iran, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore, etc.

However, three major difficulties militate against any social-scientifically valid and reliable benchmarking. For one thing, the countries in the two categories are varied in their economic and social development patterns and political stability even with the same "free-market" development ideology e.g. while the UK, the USA, Venezuela and Malaysia have government-provided social-security for their vulnerable groups, Nigeria does not. Again there are differences in their leadership ethos e.g. while the leadership in South Africa or Malaysia is accountable to its population, the one in Nigeria is virtually-immuned to the its population and governs with relative impunity. These differences will make for substantive differences in their security scenes.

And furthermore, unlike the economy for which the material for benchmarking is easily available with the World Bank/IMF/UN, the data for security is not uniformly available, if at all e.g. number/volume of crimes reported by qualitative type, place of occurrence ratio of arrest to report, socio-economic attributes of arrested offenders, ratio of prosecution to arrest, length of trial, ratio of prosecution to conviction, distribution of sentences among convicts, rate of recidivism, the trend of volume, types and seriousness of crime over time, etc.



Still, the highlighted difficulties notwithstanding, some informed observations can be made in comparing the security-scene in Nigeria with the scenes in these other countries:

- Like Nigeria, most of the “middle-income” countries indicated are not experiencing any obvious external security threat (excepting Iran and South Korea);
- In terms of intelligence, South Africa has a better harmonized intelligence services than Nigeria, even though Nigeria has been involved in the establishment and personnel training of intelligence agencies in other countries such as Niger, the Gambia, Sierra-Leone, Liberia, and even Ghana;
- With respect to ethno-religious civil-strife, Nigeria compares with India, and Egypt to some extent;
- Columbia and India are experiencing enduring separatist/secessionist insurgency [as Niger, Chad, Sudan, Ivory Coast had experienced] while the insurgency in Nigeria’s Niger-Delta does call for separation or secession;
- In terms of the processing of “common crimes”, Nigeria’s criminal justice administration system is one of the slowest and most unjust: according to the January, 2009 World Prison Population List [8th Edition], 67.8% of Nigeria’s prison-population are “on remand awaiting trial”, compared to Senegal’s 37.2%, Brazil’s 34.3%, Ghana’s 30.8%, Malaysia’s 28.7%, Iran’s 24.8%, USA’s 21.0% and England’s 15.9%;
- Compared to the other indicated middle-income countries, Nigeria has the lowest rate of convicted prisoners per 100,000 of its population: only 26 compared to Senegal/India’s 53, Ghana 59, Egypt/Venezuela’s 85, Malaysia’s 192, Brazil’s 227, and South Africa’s 334. [Note: these probably indicate the effectiveness/efficiency of the functioning of the law-enforcement and criminal justice administration in these countries compared to Nigeria’s lethargic and technicality-ridden system];
- The incidence of corruption and money laundering, and organized crime such as drug and human trafficking is relatively high and wide-spread in Nigeria compared to their acknowledged low incidence in Malaysia and Singapore, for instance;



- The feeling of insecurity among the generality of the population in Nigeria and South Africa is higher than among those of, say, Senegal and Ghana;
- The level of indiscipline and lack of law-abidingness in Nigeria is far higher than in any of the other countries being compared; and
- While both the UK and the USA recognize and appreciate the relationship between, economic, social and justice administration policies on the one hand and dispositions to criminality with implications for security on the other hand, Nigeria appears not to so recognize and appreciate.

2.1.2. Key Learning Points

From Nigeria's experience in the area of security to date as well as the observed "outcomes" of the security situation of other countries highlighted above, certain lessons are obvious. Hence, the learning points listed hereunder:

- Planning for security should be formulated in the context of socio-economic development planning and implementation;
- The leadership and government should endeavour to ensure political stability and the economic and social security of the generality of the citizens in order to counter potential exploitation of such divisive socio-economic and political cleavages for subversion of optimum security;
- The need for adequate funding of intelligence agencies and for their collaboration in sharing information routinely and promptly should be considered crucial;
- The relevance of information technology notwithstanding, human intelligence should be considered of utmost importance – and the training of Nigeria's intelligence personnel should include proficiency in French, Portuguese/Spanish, Arabic, Chinese and even Xhosa.
- Intelligence agencies should anticipate security-threat and advise policy-makers accordingly and promptly e.g. border smuggling and trafficking, impending unrest in neighbouring countries, impending ethno-religious strife in the country, etc.



- Learning from the experience of Northern Ireland, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast's, for example, political and diplomatic wisdom, strategies and methods are the ultimate effective tools for the resolution of internal insurgency;
- Industrial and technological impotence and the consequent dependence on foreign-countries for supplies of military and security equipments should be reversed with deliberate policy;
- Maintenance of friendly relations with neighbouring countries with which we share borders, land and/or coastal, is helpful to the enhancement of both external and internal security;
- The law-enforcement and security agencies should be subjected to attitudinal and behavioural re-orientation towards undiluted observance of citizens' human rights and appropriate emphasis on service-delivery to the citizens and the community;
- The criminal justice administration system should be "de-technicalised" for speedy processing of arrested and detained offenders in order to decongest the prisons;
- Law-enforcement and security agencies specifically established to handle offences of corruption, economic/financial sabotage, and other forms of organized crime should be made completely independent, unfettered by any interference, and adequately funded in a guaranteed fashion.

2.2. Local Context of the Security Thematic Area

The local context of security in Nigeria has been sufficiently covered in the introduction to this Section 2 on assessment of the current situation: the status of our external security; the relative success of our intelligence service in regard to our external security; the dire situation of our internal security in terms of periodic ethno-religious strife and the existence of a "crime-problem"; the failure of law-enforcement and the criminal justice administration system to perform optimally relative to their crime prevention/control and security-enhancing objective; the enduring counter-productive features of the system that largely account for the non-optimal performance; the consequent proliferation of vigilante groups and private security companies; and the exception of the noteworthy performance of anti-graft agencies to enhance our economic and financial security.



Therefore, it should just suffice here to add that, with regard to our external security, while our Army appears capable to meet any threat from the land as manifested by its performance in Bakassi and as regularly demonstrated with its performance in overseas peace-keeping assignments, our Navy may be considered only a notch above a Coastal Guard in terms of sea-worthy ships and equipments available to them, and our Air-Force a glorified flying-school in terms of the air-worthy modern or fighting planes at its disposal. That, it is doubtful whether the country is able to adequately counter real external threats from the sea or the air.

2.2.1. Recent/Current Development, Plans and Programmes

From about year 2000, certain policies had been pronounced, along with related plans and programmes for implementation to improve the external and internal security situation of the country.

- With respect to security in general, former President Obasanjo laid out a “National Grand Strategy for National Security” in 2000 in which, among other intentions, he enjoined security agencies to gather information and pool resources to inform and drive governmental policies and decision-makings;
- For the Armed Forces, there have been training and re-training of their personnel for enhanced professionalism, provision modern equipments, motivation of their personnel through improved conditions of service in line with global requirements, and improvement of their operational capability through frequent engagement in peace-keeping operations abroad;
- For uniformity and collaboration, there has started the joint training of intelligence officers in institutions such as the Command and Staff College, Jaji, the National Defence College and Institute of Security Studies, both in Abuja;

However, most of the recent policies, plans, programme for the betterment of internal security emanate directly or derivatively from NEEDS 1:

- Growing the economy to reduce unemployment and to provide safety nets for vulnerable groups;



- Fighting corruption and organized crime, by whoever and wherever (particularly among the personnel of security agencies) and supporting and strengthening measures and agencies in place for the purposes e.g. ICPC, EFCC, NAFDAC;
- Imbuing the right values and attitudes in the population through societal institutions such as schools, religious organizations and families to create a disciplined and law-abiding citizenry:
- Equipping and training crime prevention/control agencies (police, judiciary, prisons, customs, immigration. etc) to materially enable them as well as attitudinally see themselves as public servants who should deliver high-quality services to their customers;
- Improving the remuneration, working conditions, and welfare of the personnel of crime prevention/control agencies;
- Increasing the use of scientific methods in policing and introducing appropriate equipments and developing exclusive communication system to improve police effectiveness;
- Reduction in the use of lethal weapons to control crowds and manage civil strife;
- Attracting and recruiting police personnel with higher educational qualifications and capacity for training and re-training;
- Involving communities in policing to effect friendly, fairer and firmer interactions between the police and the public and create a police force of dedicated people who shun corruption and violation of human rights;
- Increasing access to justice (the law and the courts), with or without the intervention of lawyers, by simplifying proceedings and the law itself and by encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms that are closer to the traditional African values and practices;
- Encouraging the provision of greater state and privately funded legal assistance to the poor;



- Eliminating excessive delays in disposal of criminal cases and exploring the possibility of stipulating a reasonable duration as well as processes and procedures for hearing and determining criminal cases;
- Upgrading the infrastructures of the court system;
- Instituting a juvenile justice system in line with the provision of the Child Rights Act of 2003;
- Emphasizing rehabilitation, rather than punishment, of convicted offenders;
- Introducing a parole system and a system of house arrest for offenders who show remorse and display good conduct;
- Reducing overcrowding in prisons through an assortment of measures;
- Improving the welfare of inmates with better medical care, meals and access to recreation;
- Giving prisoners opportunities for training, skill acquisition and encouragement to engage in productive activities such as agriculture, arts, crafts, and small-scale industries as well as access to cheap credit for starting their own business upon release from prison;
- Giving opportunity to NGOs and religious organizations to provide assistance to prisoners and improve their living environment;
- Encouraging the private sector to build prison infrastructures for lease to government; and
- Training, equipping and orienting prison warders to handle prisoners even-handedly.

In addition, there has been other policies, initiatives, and programme, after the release of NEEDS 1, to further the issue of security:

- Establishment of a Ministerial Committee on Defence Transformation to further professionalism through training;



- Statutory establishment of specialized security agencies for specific security threats e.g. Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps to deal with various kinds of vandalism of public property and regulate the licensing and functioning of private security guards; NAPTIP to counter human trafficking;
- Policy and operational cooperation with regional [e.g. GIABA] and international organization [e.g. UNODC] in furtherance of the fight against corruption and organized crime, as well as strengthen observance of human rights by the Prisons respectively;
- Inspectors-General of Police have put out various security-enhancing programmes for their tenure e.g. the last one but two had the motto of “fire-for-fire” in response to the upsurge of armed-robbery; the mantra of the last but one was “service with integrity” against the background of public complaints of violation of human rights by the police; and the current IGP has a 9-Way Test encompassing all and sundry matters, ranging from “transparency/accountability”, through “intelligence/crime database” and “training”, to “community policing” and “inter-agency cooperation”;
- Constitution of three separate Presidential Committees on Reforms of the Police, the Prisons, and Administration of Criminal Justice, all of which had submitted their Reports since 2006;
- The current President, upon assumption of office in 2007 insisted that the guiding policies of his Administration would be the “rule of law” and “due process” in all areas of public life, including the administration of criminal justice;
- There is an on-going programme being implemented by the Federal Ministry of Justice to decongest the prisons: as of April, 2008, 23, 444, “awaiting trial” cases had been farmed out as legal briefs to various private legal firms to sort them out for discharge, bail, trial, etc; and
- There is a recently inaugurated and functioning “Police Reform Implementation Committee” by the Honourable Minister of Police Affairs to effect those recommendations of the Report of the Presidential Committee that the government



has accepted towards re-organization and re-positioning of the Police for effective performance.

2.3. Issues and Challenges

Inspite of the recent policies, plans, and programmes outlined above and aimed at enhancing security in the country, certain key issues and challenges remain. These include:

- Need to further develop manpower and equipment requirements of the Armed Forces to meet growing challenges from potential security threats, locally, regionally, and internationally;
- Absence of an established military-industrial-complex for the manufacture, maintenance, and administration of operational equipments;
- Lack of a Research and Development establishment to pursue and achieve specific national goals;
- Over dependence on oil and revenue therefrom constitutes a future threat and challenge in view of oil discoveries in Chad, Ghana, and Darfur;
- Inadequate funding of intelligence–services for systematic training and procurement of modern equipments;
- Absence of mutual trust between the intelligence and the policy “communities”;
- Review of the various Acts establishing the security agencies to minimize duplication and avoid conflict of roles and functions;
- The length of Nigeria’s borders and the need for their systematic surveillance;
- Acute shortage of barrack accommodation for the military and the police personnel and the challenge this poses for mobilization as the need arises;
- Substantial non-delivery of the poverty-and-unemployment-reduction dividends of the well-intentioned economic reforms in the earlier part of this decade and the non-mitigation of their social costs to vulnerable groups;



- Increasing the tempo of the fight against corruption, evenly and transparently across the board, and to the knowledge of the generality of the citizens;
- The non-implementation of most of the security-related policies, plans, and programmes outlined in NEEDS 1 remains a serious challenge to governmental credibility;
- Absence of an overall and overarching strategy and coordinating body for overall planning for crime prevention and control in the country;
- Absence of rich/informative, valid and reliable data on all dimensions of the crime problem: incidence and patterns of crime, socio-economic attributes of known offenders, and their processing by the law-enforcement and criminal justice administration agencies routinely and systematically collected, annually collated and analyzed, and provided to policy-makers;
- The continuing non-provision of victim-remedies in our system of criminal justice administration can only continue to be unhelpful to the system which needs victims as witness/informants, apart from other moral and justice considerations; and
- The non-provision of a statutory/legal framework for all the reform policies and measures which had been enunciated. Yet, majority of them require repeal or amendment of existing substantive and procedural laws and/or the enactment of new ones for them to be implementable. This is a challenge to commitment and political will.

2.4. Strategic Imperatives and Opportunities for Nigeria

To achieve an optimum level of security towards 2020 and beyond, certain strategic imperatives should obtain:

- An economically and socially just, politically stable, and truly democratic society;
- An appropriately and adequately trained and equipped Armed Forces, in line with the contemporary challenges of a globalised and digitalized world;



- Joint basic training for all our security-intelligence services to ingrain in them shared vision, values, professional ethics, and patriotic commitment;
- Broad conceptualization of security, the problem of crime, and its prevention and control, in the context of economic and social development;
- Perception of internal security in terms of the security of the generality of the population, and on a daily basis;
- Acceleration of the delivery of the poverty-and-unemployment-reduction dividends of the operating economic reforms and the mitigation of their social costs on the more vulnerable groups;
- Increase of the tempo of the fight against corruption and organized crime, evenly and transparently across the board, and to the knowledge or perception of the generality of the population:
- Articulation and coordination of the objectives, strategies and activities of the four major conventional subsystems and instrumentalities of crime prevention and control as a “system”;
- Systematic and routine collection, collation, analysis and regular/annual publication of social-scientific data on crime, criminals, victims and their processing by the police, courts and prisons;
- Employment of rich, valid and reliable statistics on crime, criminals, victims etc. for crime prevention/control planning. projection, monitoring and evaluation;
- Institutionalization of adequate dosage of “victim justice system” into the operative criminal justice system through victim remedies, restitution, and compensation;
- Concentration of appropriate emphasis and input on the training and attitudinal re-orientation of the lower-cadre personnel of the law-enforcement, justice-administration and offender-correction agencies;
- Provision of legal framework — by way of repeal/amendment of “obstructive” existing legislation and enactment of new ones — to enable the actual



implementation of the policies and measures contained in both NEEDS and NEEDS 2; and

- Mobilization of the political will and funding required to implement the paradigm shift entailed by the policies and measures contained in NEEDS 1 and 2, and in the Presidential Committees/Commission on Police, Prisons and Administration of Criminal Justice as accepted in their associated White Papers.

The opportunities to emplace these imperatives and achieve the desirable/desired level of security for the country towards 2020 and beyond abound:

- Nigeria has a large expanse of land, blessed with varying vegetation and climate for agricultural production throughout the year. It has a large and culturally-diverse population with well-educated elite and middle-class, skilled working-class, and hardworking farming/rural peasants. It is endowed with oil, gas, and other mineral resources in abundance. It has the largest consumer-market in Africa. In other words, it is a materially and humanly rich country which can afford the monetary, material and human cost of a viable and performing security system;
- The intellectual input for appropriate policies, plans, and programmes for enhanced security as well as the modus for their implementation are already “on the shelves” in the offices of the relevant policy-makers;
- The top echelon and officer cadre of the law-enforcement and security agencies have been exposed to appropriate training, including participation in the production of policy and implementation documents on the various dimensions of the security issue; and
- The generality of the Nigeria citizenry would gladly welcome sincere governmental efforts to improve the security situation in the country and enhance their feeling of security.



2.5. Key Success Factors

Assuming good and committed governmental leadership, good governance, and an economically and socially just and politically stable Nigeria, the key factors to “measure” the success of our security sector are as follows:

- Political, diplomatic, military and quality-intelligence capability and readiness to meet both direct and sponsored challenges to our national interest, especially in the West African sub-region;
- Patent leadership in the West African Region;
- Pre-emptive nipping in the bud of imminent ethno-religious strife through the availability and provision of quality-intelligence;
- Resolution of the Niger-Delta crisis firmly but with justice, equity and fairness to both the constituent geo-political zone and the Federal Republic of Nigeria as an entity;
- Governmental manifestation and sustenance of a broad conceptualization of internal security and the problem of crime and its prevention and control;
- Governmental manifestation of the perception of internal security in terms of the security of life and property of the average citizen;
- Increased delivery of the poverty-and-unemployment dividends of on-going economic reforms and accelerated provisions of remedies for their social costs;
- Publicly-perceived even-handedness and transparency in the fight against corruption among all the socio-economic strata of the society;
- Alignment of the recommendations of the White Papers of the separate Reports of the three Presidential Committees/Commission (Police, Prisons Administration of Justice) into a single crime-prevention and control “blue-print” document for coordinated implementation;
- Establishment of a crime prevention and control coordinating social-science-based body: that is, a National Commission for Crime Prevention and Control as



institutional framework for policy advising research, training and development, monitoring and evaluation, and over-sight of the implementation of a comprehensive national crime prevention and control strategy;

- Availability of annually published information-rich, valid and reliable crime, crime-prevention/control, law-enforcement and criminal justice administration data — and their use for planning, projection, monitoring and evaluation of policies and measures;
- Attitudinally re-oriented lower-cadre personnel of the police, courts, and prisons;
- Legislation enabling the actual implementation of criminal justice administration policies and measures that would un-encumber the system for higher productivity e.g. decriminalization of misdemeanors and minor offences, detechnicalisation and simplification of court procedures for non-serious offences and non-fatal traffic officers, delimitation of length of trial, victim remedies. de-institutionalization of sentences for minor offences, eradication of juvenile imprisonment; etc
- Improved quality of recruits into the Police Force;
- Increased public perception of police effectiveness, responsiveness, equity and efficiency;
- Increased public perception of the amount and quality of the protection the police offers the citizens as a whole and increase in the degree of confidence and cooperation the police enjoys from the average citizen;
- Public perception of criminal justice/court processes as real and meaningful rather than “technical” and foreign;
- Significant reduction in the use of imprisonment for convicted minor or traffic offenders and in the use of prison-remand for non-dangerous offenders awaiting trial;
- Improved conditions of existence for convicted prisoners in decongested prisons;



- Removal of the collateral consequences of criminal conviction by government and attitudinal change by the public with respect to the disabling social stigma against ex-prisoners; and
- Appreciable enhancement of feeling of security by the generality of the citizens via considerable reduction of the crime-problem in the country to an optimum/tolerable level.

3.0 Vision, Objectives, Goals Strategies and Initiatives

Vision :

An economically-prosperous, politically-stable and socially-just society where security of life and property of the generality of the people is guaranteed against victimization from both external and internal threats or attacks in all places and at all times, be it military, economic, political or social.

OBJECTIVE 1: To Ensure and Maintain a Flexible, Compact, Disciplined, Well Trained, Highly Mobile, Motivated and Capable Armed Forces.		
Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
1. Enhanced and adequate funding for contemporary and futuristic manpower training programmes of the Armed Forces.	1) Preparation of realistic budget for the manpower training requirements of the Armed Forces.	1)The Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to assess the manpower training requirements of the Armed Forces with a view to submitting a realistic and harmonised budget proposal to the Honourable Minister of Defence at least six (6) months preceding the next fiscal year
		2) The Ministry of Defence to monitor, on quarterly basis, the implementation of the training programme of the Armed Forces.
	2) Recruitment and sustenance of high quality manpower for the Armed Forces.	1)The Armed Forces to establish permanent recruitment centres along with the recently introduced electronic recruiting procedures across the country.
		2) Service Chiefs to rigorously enforce the stipulated minimum recruitment standards including background checks.



OBJECTIVE 1: To Ensure and Maintain a Flexible, Compact, Disciplined, Well Trained, Highly Mobile, Motivated and Capable Armed Forces.		
Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
	3) Vigorous pursuit of training and re-training programmes of the Armed Forces manpower to meet present and growing security challenges.	Service Chiefs to enforce strict adherence to budgeted training and retraining of Armed Forces personnel.
	4) Periodic review of Armed Forces training institution's curriculum to meet emergent regional and global challenges.	The Service Chiefs to cause annual review of training curricula on the basis of post mortem analysis of training exercises and emerging challenges.
	5) Continued reorientation programme for Armed Forces personnel in the areas of human rights and democracy.	The Chief of Defence staff to introduce a new course into the Armed Forces training curricula on 'Democratic Principles and Practices'.
2. A comprehensive motivational welfare package for personnel of the Armed Forces	1) Immediate re-appraisal and review of the existing Terms and Conditions of Service (TACOS).	Chief of Defence Staff to establish a Standing Committee for the periodic reappraisal and review of Terms and Conditions of Service (TACOS) and Salaries, Allowances and Pensions for the Armed Forces.
	2) Upward review and remuneration of the Armed Forces personnel for better motivation.	Same as Goal 2, Strategy 1, Initiative 1 above.
	3) Renovation of barracks and construction of new ones to provide adequate accommodation nationwide for personnel of the Armed Forces and their families.	
2) MOD to increase budgetary allocations for renovations and construction of barracks		



OBJECTIVE 1: To Ensure and Maintain a Flexible, Compact, Disciplined, Well Trained, Highly Mobile, Motivated and Capable Armed Forces.		
Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
		accommodation for Armed Forces Personnel.
		3) Service Chiefs to establish Direct Labour Units as currently obtains in the Army for aggressive direct labour construction of barracks and accommodation.
	4) Strengthen the existing Armed Forces welfare schemes such as the N.A Welfare Holding Ltd., N.A Post Service Housing Scheme and their equivalents in Navy and Airforce, along the lines of contemporary national social security policies.	1) Service Chiefs to build modern shopping centres/malls to replace the present mammy markets in all the barracks.
		2) Service Chiefs to grant concessions to private organisations to run entertainment services as cinemas, sports etc in all barracks and with adequate security provisions.
	5) Improvement of Armed Forces primary and secondary schools in the barracks.	1) Service Chiefs to increase funding for the administration and running of primary and secondary schools in the barracks.
		2) Minister of Defence to contact UBEC and SPEB for Armed Forces schools to benefit from their intervention programme.



OBJECTIVE 1: To Ensure and Maintain a Flexible, Compact, Disciplined, Well Trained, Highly Mobile, Motivated and Capable Armed Forces.			
Goals	Strategies	Initiatives	
	6) Provision of modern medical facilities (e.g. Intensive Care Units-ICU, Digital Field Analysers, Air Ambulances e.t.c) in all Armed Forces hospitals.	Minister of Defence to include in the budget provisions for upgrading of all Military Reference Hospitals/ Medical Centres as well as provision for modern medical field analysis and air ambulances for services.	
3) A modern, compact, flexible and well equipped mobile Armed Forces.	1) Establish a ministerial committee to propose to government a desirable force structure by the year 2015 for the Nigerian Armed Forces.	Ministry Of Defence to place the draft Defence Transformation Agenda before the Presidency for approval and implementation.	
	2) Re-appraise the current arms and equipment holding of the Armed Forces to conform with modern day technology	Ministry Of Defence to direct Chief Of Defence Staff to constitute a Committee to make a submission to it on an appropriate force structure and standard arms and equipment holdings of the Armed Forces required to meet the nation's domestic, sub-regional and regional security commitments by the year 2020.	
	3) Provision of adequate funding for the maintenance of the Armed Forces hardware and equipment.		1) Government to ensure correspondence between required force structure, arms and equipment on the one hand and budgeted funds on the other hand.
			2) Ministry Of Defence to explore private sector participation in maintenance of military hardware and equipment and retrofitting of all Armed Forces maintenance workshops.
	4) Create an Aviation Unit to enhance the mobility and flexibility of the Army.	Ministry of Defence to direct the Chief Of Defence Staff to cause the Chief Of Army Staff to make a submission to it on the necessities and cost implications of an aviation unit for the Army, specifically, and budget for its establishment accordingly.	



OBJECTIVE 1: To Ensure and Maintain a Flexible, Compact, Disciplined, Well Trained, Highly Mobile, Motivated and Capable Armed Forces.		
Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
	5) Government adherence to constitutional provisions regarding the deployment of the Armed Forces in our democracy.	The President and the National Assembly to ensure strict adherence to constitutional provisions on this matter.
	6) Commit at least 5% of the Defence budget to defence Research and Development(R & D) annually.	Ministry Of Defence to ensure that at least 5% of total Defence budget is devoted to Research and Development from fiscal year 2012.
	7) Reorganise Defence Industrial Corporation of Nigeria (DICON) to make it functional and productive in line with its statutory mandate.	The law establishing DICON to be amended to make it a public-private partnership in which the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Science and Technology, STEYR and other appropriate private sector bodies are partners.
	8) Government should encourage closer collaboration amongst DICON, STEYR (Special Vehicle Plant-Bauchi) and the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology.	As for strategy 7 above.
	9) Provision for private public partnership participation in the local manufacture of most of our military needs.	As for strategy 7 above.
	10) Enhance our defence industrial efforts towards the production of short/medium range weapons by the year 2020.	As for strategy 7 above.
	11) Intensify Joint Warfare exercises and training.	i). Chief Of Defence Staff to ensure the execution of Joint Warfare exercise and training annually.
		ii). Chief Of Defence Staff to constitute a Committee for the possible establishment of a Joint Intelligence and Operational Centre which should include the major security agencies.



OBJECTIVE 2: To facilitate an efficient, reliable and proactive intelligence gathering system that procures and delivers intelligence in a manner that is timely and accurate.		
Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
1. Knowledgeable leadership of the National Security Office who is well-grounded and well-informed about national, regional and international geo-politics, both historically and contemporaneously.	Widen the search for future holders of the Office of the NSA beyond the military/intelligence circles to the intellectual and related communities.	Presidency to constitute a Committee to consider the goal and strategy for a policy decision on the matter.
2. Existence of a committed core of intelligence personnel imbued with a deep sense of patriotism to protect the nation against both external and internal threats and sabotage.	Proportion of annual recruits into the intelligence agencies to be based on agency-determined efforts which target potential operatives from tertiary institutions before their graduation---as British Intelligence recruits from Oxford and Cambridge Universities, for example.	1). Office of the NSA to develop "targetting" criteria for recruitment of such a core.
		2). Office of the NSA to cause the various agencies to commence the effort from 2010.
3. Enhanced funding for training, research and development and capacity building of intelligence services for the production of reliable and qualitative intelligence to proactively meet all our security challenges.	1)Intelligence agencies to furnish government with the list of their development, capacity building and operational equipment needs required for qualitative intelligence production.	The office of the National Security Adviser to collate the requirements of all the Intelligence Agencies to Government for funding.
	2) Adequate budgetary allocation from the year 2010 informed by the list above.	Office of the NSA and the Permanent Secretary, Special Services office of The Presidency to henceforth ensure that the Budgetary submissions of the various Intelligence Agencies are met.



OBJECTIVE 2: To facilitate an efficient, reliable and proactive intelligence gathering system that procures and delivers intelligence in a manner that is timely and accurate.		
Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
	3) Enhanced training and retraining of security operatives at all levels towards emergent security challenges nationally, regionally and internationally.	A technical Committee of all Intelligence Agencies and other Stakeholders under the auspices of the Office of the NSA to produce an updated and harmonised curriculum for the training and retraining of all operatives of the agencies.
	4) Enhanced remuneration and welfare packages for intelligence operatives	Government to establish a Committee to review the salaries, allowances and other welfare packages of the Intelligence Agencies to compare favourably with similar agencies in emergent economies .
	5) Enhanced protection for the identity of intelligence / security operatives beyond the provisions of the Official Security Act	NSA to propose law for the provision of such protection for enactment
4. Acquisition of independent COMSAT to facilitate intelligence gathering and surveillance by the year 2015.	1)Procure the equipments and technical know-how for a Nigerian owned COMSAT for intelligence production purposes.	The NSA to direct the NIA to identify credible and competent technical partners for procurement of the equipments for government funding.
	2) Provision and installation of ground based electronic surveillance equipment at strategic places on our borders	1)NSA to cause graphic identification of our borders by the Surveyor General of the Federation in liaison with the National Boundaries Commission.
		2) NSA to cause all agencies to submit an appropriate list of ground surveillance equipment required by them for collation, funding and installation



OBJECTIVE 2: To facilitate an efficient, reliable and proactive intelligence gathering system that procures and delivers intelligence in a manner that is timely and accurate.		
Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
5. Security consciousness among the majority of Nigerians	1) Educate Nigerians in security consciousness in association with civil society through seminars and publicity.	The NSA to cause Intelligence Agencies to produce a blue print on the enhancement of security awareness in the population.
	2) Inclusion of security education in our schools' curriculum at all levels.	Government to direct the Federal Ministry of Education to adapt the security awareness blueprint into the school curriculum.
6. Mutually trusting intelligence services, and bonding operatives, that co-operate with each other for security on both external and internal fronts.	1) Establishment of a Joint Intelligence training Institution, at the primary level, for personnel of various Intelligence Agencies for shared values, commitment and orientation	The NSA to cause the emergence and operation of Joint Training Institution for personnel of all Intelligence Agencies while making allowance for specialisation.
	2) Institutionalise inter-service operations	The NSA to submit a memo to the President for an Executive Order to institutionalise inter-service operations.



OBJECTIVE 3: To emplace and implement comprehensive, social-scientific, effective and efficient crime prevention and control strategy.

Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
<p>1. Establishment of an overall and overarching strategy and coordinating body for national planning for crime prevention and control strategy.</p>	<p>Enact law to establish a social science-based Commission for Crime Prevention and Control.</p>	<p>The Presidency to direct The AGF to draft an Executive Bill to the NASS for the establishment of a social-science-based Commission for Crime Prevention and Control.</p>
<p>2. Provision of statutory legal framework for all the reform policies and measures which have been enunciated to date through NEEDS 1 & the White Papers on the reports of the three Presidential Committees/Commission on the Police, Prisons and Criminal Justice Administration.</p>	<p>Convene a meeting of high level policy makers, chairpersons of appropriate NASS committees, heads of major instrumentalities of security agencies, experts in criminology and social sciences and other stake holders under the auspices of The Presidency to deliberate a National Crime Prevention Strategy and constitute an Ad-hoc Technical Committee to harmonize the Reports/White Papers into a single Crime-Prevention and Control 'Blue-Print' document for coordinated implementation.</p>	<p>Presidency to constitute an Ad-Hoc Technical Committee to develop relevant legal framework.</p>
<p>3. Provision of rich/informative, valid and reliable data on all dimensions of the crime problem: incidence and patterns of crime, socio-economic attributes of known offenders,</p>	<p>1) Re-organize/modernize towards a comprehensive and reliable data collation and collection system by law enforcement and criminal justice administration agencies.</p>	<p>Respective agencies to hire social- science based criminologists as consultants to develop data-collection formats for law enforcement, criminal justice administration and offender-correction, respectively, and apply these formats for data collection/collation, analysis and publication for three years in the first instance, on a pilot basis.</p>



OBJECTIVE 3: To emplace and implement comprehensive, social-scientific, effective and efficient crime prevention and control strategy.

Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
<p>and their processing by the law-enforcement and criminal justice administration agencies routinely and systematically collected, annually collated and analyzed, and provided to policy-makers & other stake holders.</p>	<p>2) Develop 3 crime and criminal justice administration data formats to capture required information from the Police, Judiciary and Prisons and other law enforcement agencies.</p>	<p>Respective law enforcement agencies to hire social-science-based criminologists as consultants to emplace and train specialised corps for data collection, collation, analysis and publication in the Police, Judiciary, Prisons for three-year period.</p>
	<p>3) Establish a specialized corps for data collection, collation, analysis and publication.</p>	<p>Govt to provide funding for the emplacement and training of the specialised Corps.</p>
<p>4. De-technicalised and simplified process of criminal justice administration.</p>	<p>Review procedural laws to make the process real and meaningful rather than 'technical' and foreign and to un-encumber the system for higher productivity.</p>	<p>1) Govt. to convene a meeting of the Bar, Bench, Ministry of Justice and social-science based Criminologists, under the auspices of 'The Nigeria Law Reform Commission' to constitute a Technical Committee to review extant procedural laws for de-technicalization and simplification.</p>
		<p>2) Consideration of the report of the Technical Committee for submission to The Presidency for the drafting of a bill to the National Assembly for enactment.</p>
		<p>3) National Judicial Institute to organise training programmes for Judicial officers at all levels for adaptation to the de-technicalised and simplified procedural laws.</p>
<p>5. Accessible and affordable Criminal Justice Administration.</p>	<p>1) Improve the physical and administrative infrastructure of existing courts to meet up with demands of modern judicial system</p>	<p>The Judiciary to audit their physical and administrative infrastructure and submit detailed list of its insufficiencies to Govt. for remediation.</p>



OBJECTIVE 3: To emplace and implement comprehensive, social-scientific, effective and efficient crime prevention and control strategy.		
Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
	2) Create additional courts with a view to bringing justice nearer to the grass roots and to promote faster disposal of justice.	The Judiciary to submit comprehensive cost implication to Govt. to provide funds for creation of the additional courts.
	3) Make Legal Aid available to all indigent accused persons, excepting cases of corruption, money laundering and drug & human trafficking and the likes of these.	National Human Rights Commission, in liaison with the Federal Ministry of Justice, to review the relevant Act and propose necessary amendments to the National Assembly through the Presidency.
	4) Enforcement of the provisions of the Child Rights Act of 2003 for an effective juvenile justice system.	Federal Ministries of Justice, Women Affairs, and Youth and Social Development to produce a Joint Council Memo to the Council of State for adoption and enforcement across the States of the Federation.
6. Increased public perception of the effectiveness, responsiveness, equity and efficiency of law enforcement agencies, especially the Police.	1) Automate and raise standards of recruitment into the Police, including security vetting and social / psychological aptitude test.	1) The Police Service Commission (PSC) to develop appropriate applicable test format and commence their application for recruitment.
		2) PSC to develop effective security vetting system for all applicants for recruitment/enlistment.
	2) Basic training curriculum to include adequate dosage of history of Nigeria and its policing, social sciences subjects, and issues such as the importance of policing in society, the meaning and exercise of discretion, police powers vis-a vis human rights of citizens etc.	The IGP to cause revision of the training curriculum and preparation of their cost implications for submission to Govt. for funding.
	3) Length of basic training period to be increased to minimum of 18 months.	The PSC to submit proposal for the increase in length of training and submit cost implication for funding.



OBJECTIVE 3: To emplace and implement comprehensive, social-scientific, effective and efficient crime prevention and control strategy.

Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
	<p>4) Deliberate retraining of police personnel already in service on subjects and issues identified in strategy 2 above, concentration of appropriate emphasis and input on the re-training and attitudinal re-orientation of the lower cadre personnel.</p>	<p>1) The PSC to emphasise police powers in relation to citizen's rights in the training curriculum.</p> <p>2) The IGP to resuscitate the system of police handbook and police notebook and ensure their issuance to all rank and file.</p>
	<p>5) Police and other law enforcement agencies to furnish to Govt. for funding lists of operational equipment (transportation, communication, and other equipment) needed to effectively police the country as well as accoutrements for every police man and law enforcement agency on three yearly basis.</p>	<p>Police to audit their insufficiencies and submit financial implication to Govt. for funding.</p>
	<p>6) Introduction of the use of scientific aids for crime investigation and detection in policing in general.</p>	<p>Police to prepare list and cost implication of scientific laboratory and required crime investigation and detection equipment including details on corresponding training programmes.</p>
	<p>7) Improve the remuneration, working conditions and welfare of the personnel of crime prevention and control agencies especially because of the risky dimensions of their work.</p>	<p>Police to audit staff strength and prepare related cost estimates for renovation of offices and barracks, and for staff welfare needs and submit to Government for funding.</p>



OBJECTIVE 3: To emplace and implement comprehensive, social-scientific, effective and efficient crime prevention and control strategy.

Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
	8) Increase in tempo of the fight against corruption and organized crime evenly and transparently across the board and to the knowledge or perception of the generality of the population.	Govt. to show political will to desist from interfering in the work of ICPC, EFCC, and other relevant bodies.
	9) Involvement of communities in policing to effect friendly, fairer and firmer interactions between the police and the public	1) Govt. to create specialised courts and special procedures for this category of crimes. 2) Trial of offenders at their localities and the use of their forfeited assets, if any, for provision of infrastructures and services at their local communities. 3) Initiatives as in goal 6, strategy 4, above.
7. Significant reduction in the use of imprisonment for convicted minor or traffic offenders and in the use of prison-remand for non-dangerous offenders awaiting trial.	1) Enact legislation for the introduction and use of non-custodial sanctions for convicted minor/non-dangerous offenders. e.g. victim remedies, such as compensation and restitution; fines payable by installment; community service or labour; probation; suspended sentence.	1) Organisation of Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) between lower cadre policemen and representatives of the community at the grass roots across all the LGAs in the country. 2) Federal Ministry of Justice to initiate the enactment of necessary laws and amendments.
	2) Liberalise bail conditions for working class and poor people.	The CJN & the IGP to issue guidelines towards liberalisation of the granting of bail for bailable offences.
	3) Build separate facilities under direct supervision of courts for those on remand awaiting trial.	Prison Service to assess need for Remand Centres across the Federation and make a submission, along with cost implications, to Government for consideration and funding.



OBJECTIVE 3: To emplace and implement comprehensive, social-scientific, effective and efficient crime prevention and control strategy.

Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
	4) Enhance Funding through contribution by state governments.	Presidency to submit proposal to Council of States for shared funding for the maintenance and sustenance of Prisons by the three tiers of Govt.
8. Improved conditions of existence for convicted prisoners in decongested prisons.	1) Significant movement towards meeting the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (UN SMR) to which Nigeria has been a signatory.	Nigeria Prisons Service to identify operational deficits in meeting UN SMR and submit needs to Govt. for funding
	2) Partnering with the Private Sector to build Prison Infrastructures for lease to Government.	1). Prison Service to assess its physical/ infrastructural needs across the Federation to determine appropriate areas of lease arrangement with the private sector.
	3) Create conducive environment for non-governmental, community based and religious organisations to provide assistance to prisoners as well as improve their living environment.	2) Prison Service and Govt. to meet with the Private Sector to initiate amendment to prisons law to enable partnership
		3) As for strategy 2 above.
	4) Re-train, equip and re-orient prison warders to handle prisoners humanely.	1) Prisons to liberalise guidelines to make it easier for these bodies to provide assistance without compromising security. 2) Prison Service to propose re-training of lower cadre personnel with emphasis on attitudinal re-orientation.
5) Effective, but not intrusive, presence of Policemen in crime –prone areas of communities.	Reinforcement of foot and motorised patrol especially at strategic crime-prone areas of towns and cities as well as intelligence-informed areas of impending threats to law and order.	



OBJECTIVE 3: To emplace and implement comprehensive, social-scientific, effective and efficient crime prevention and control strategy.		
Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
9. Appreciable enhancement of feeling of security by the generality of the citizens via considerable reduction of the crime-problem in the country to tolerable level.	1) Coordination of crime reduction measures among Law Enforcement Agencies and regular publicity/ announcement of reassuring law enforcement activities.	Police to institute regular meetings of law enforcement agencies to facilitate enhanced coordination;
	2) Review the statutory mandate and operational modus of NEMA to rationally amend its laws and re-organise the Agency, accordingly.	Police to collect and collate information on encouraging law activities and ensure publicity of same.
10. Significant protection of public property and citizens against vandalism / economic sabotage and disorder respectively	1) Adequate enablement of the National Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) for enhanced performance of its mandate	1) Government to provide substantial take-off/establishment Grant to NSCDC
		2) Presidency to authorize appropriate carrying of arms by NSCDC personnel as allowed by law since 2007.



OBJECTIVE 4: To ensure preparedness for adequate and efficient response to natural and man-made disasters.		
Goals	Strategies	Initiatives
1. An established, appropriately staffed and well equipped government disaster-specific response and relief body	1) Review the statutory mandate and operational modus of NEMA and the Federal Fire Service to rationally amend their laws and re-organise accordingly	1) Presidency to constitute a Technical Committee to undertake a working visit to an emerging country with good reputation for managing disasters (e.g. Cuba).
		2) Subsequently, Technical Committee to review laws and operations of NEMA and the Federal Fire Service and submit a "blue-print" to Government, along with fund requirement, for necessary action with respect to re-organisation, staff/staff training, adequate equipment.
		3) Submission of proposed amendments in the laws of NEMA and Federal Fire Service to National Assembly for enactment.
2. Systematic and reliable availability of disaster response and relief fund.	Establishment of a "National Disaster Fund" law.	1) Submission of an Executive Bill to the National Assembly for the establishment of the Fund.
		2) Annual budgeting for effective/efficient disaster response and relief based on prior experience and rational projection.
OBJECTIVE 5: To provide infrastructure for the prevention, management and resolution of ethno-religious conflicts.		
Goal	Strategy	Initiative



A knowledge based capacity for the prevention, management and resolution of ethno-religious conflict	Establishment of a Peace and Conflict Resolution Commission for research and arbitration of conflict	Presidency to propose the establishment of the Commission.
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4.0 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN AND IMPLEMENTATION MONITORING TOOL.

In the following tabular presentation of the implementation plan and monitoring tool for the initiatives indicated in Chapter 3, Column 1 has been added for ease of relating the plans and tools to the initiatives and their generic objectives, goals and strategies.

4.1 OBJECTIVE 1:

To ensure and maintain a flexible, compact, disciplined, well trained, highly mobile, motivated and capable armed forces.

INITIATIVES OBJECTIVE, GOAL, STRATEGY & INITIATIVES	IMPLEMENTATION PLAN						IMPLEMENTATION MONITORING TOOL				
	IMPLEMEN TING AGENCIES	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009- 2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012- 2015)	LONG TERM (2016- 2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 1, Goal 1, Strategy 1, Initiative 1 1-1-1-1	Defence Headquarter s (DHQ)	Army, Navy, Airforce	Ministry of Defence (MOD)	2010	-	-	Ministry of Defence (MOD)	Monthly	Submission of harmonised budget.	None	None
Objective 1, Goal 1, Strategy 1, Initiative 2	MOD	Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD	2010	2012	2020	MOD, DHQ	Quarterly	Timely execution of training schedules	Inadequate funding.	Provision of adequate funds.



1-1-1-2											
Objective 1, Goal 1, Strategy 2, Initiative 1	Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD, DHQ	MOD	2010	2015	2016	MOD,DHQ	Annually	Progressive establishment of recruitment centers.	Inadequate funding.	Provision of adequate funds.
1-1-2-1											
Objective 1, Goal 1, Strategy 2, Initiative 2	Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD, IGP, SSS, State Govts	MOD	2010	2015	2020	MOD	Bi-annually	Quality recruits	None	None
1-1-2-2											
OBJECTIVE, GOAL, STRATEGY & INITIATIVES	IMPLEMEN TING AGENCIES	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009- 2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012- 2015)	LONG TERM (2016- 2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 1, Goal 1, Strategy 3, Initiative 1	Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD	MOD	2010	2015	2020	MOD,DHQ	Quarterly	Continuously trained Personnel	None	None
1-1-3-1											
Objective 1, Goal 1, Strategy 4, Initiative 1	Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD,DHQ	MOD	2010	2015	2020	MOD,DHQ	Annually	Improved operational performances	None	None
1-1-4-1											
Objective 1, Goal 1, Strategy 5, Initiative 1	DHQ	MOD, Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD	2010	-	-	MOD	Quarterly	Improved Civil- Military Relations	None	None
1-1-5-1											
Objective 1, Goal 2, Strategy 2, Initiative 1	DHQ	Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD	2011	2015	2020	MOD,DHQ	Biennially	Better motivated Armed Forces personnel	None	None
1-2-2-1											
Objective 1, Goal 2,	DHQ	Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD	2011	2015	2020	MOD,DHQ	Biennially	Better motivated Armed Forces	Inadequate	Provision of adequate



Strategy 2, Initiative 2 1-2-2-2									personnel	funding.	funds.
Objective 1, Goal 2, Strategy 3, Initiative 1 1-2-3-1	Presidency	MOD,DHQ	Presidency	2011	2015	2020	MOD,DHQ	Annually	Well refurbished barracks	Inadequate funding.	Provision of adequate funds.
OBJECTIVE, GOAL, STRATEGY & INITIATIVES	IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 1, Goal 2, Strategy 3, Initiative 2 1-2-3-2	MOD	DHQ, Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD	2011	2015	2020	MOD	Annually	Provision of modern barracks	Inadequate funding.	Provision of adequate funds.
Objective 1, Goal 2, Strategy 3, Initiative 3 1-2-3-3	Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD	MOD	2010	2015	2020	MOD	Annually	Adequate barrack accommodation	None	None
Objective 1, Goal 2, Strategy 4,	Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD	MOD	-	2015	2020	MOD	Annually	Improved welfare amenities	Inadequate	Provision of adequate funds.



Initiative 1 1-2-4-1										funding.	
Objective 1, Goal 2, Strategy 4, Initiative 2 1-2-4-2	Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD, Private sector bodies.	MOD and Private sector bodies.	-	2015	2020	Army, Navy, Airforce	Annually	Modern and efficient entertainment facilities in barracks	None	None
Objective 1, Goal 2, Strategy 5, Initiative 1 1-2-5-1	Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD	MOD	2010	2015	2020	MOD, Army, Navy, Airforce	Annually	Improved students performance in National examinations	Inadequate funding.	Provision of adequate funds
Objective 1, Goal 2, Strategy 5, Initiative 2 1-2-5-2	MOD	Federal Ministry of Education/State Govts	UBEC, ETF and SPEBs.	2010	2012	2020	MOD, Army, Navy, Airforce	Annually	Improved education facilities.	Inadequate funding.	Provision of adequate funds
OBJECTIVE, GOAL, STRATEGY & INITIATIVES	IMPLEMEN TING AGENCIES	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009- 2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012- 2015)	LONG TERM (2016- 2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 1, Goal 2, Strategy 6, Initiative 1 1-2-6-1	MOD	Army, Navy, Airforce and Federal Ministry of Health.	MOD	2010	2015	2020	MOD	Annually	Improved medical services for Armed Forces Personnel.	Inadequate funding.	Provision of adequate funds
Objective 1, Goal 3, Strategy 1, Initiative 1 1-3-1-1	MOD	DHQ, Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD	2010	2015	2020	MOD	Annually	A virile Armed Forces capable of achieving the national defence policy objectives.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inadequate funding, Lack of commitment and will to implement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adequate budgetary provisions Political will to implement policies/good coordination.



Objective 1, Goal 3, Strategy 2, Initiative 1 1-3-2-1	MOD	DHQ, Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD	2010	2015	2020	MOD	Annually	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Constitution of Committee • Submission of Report by Committee 	None	None
Objective 1, Goal 3, Strategy 3, Initiative 1 1-3-3-1	Presidency	MOD,DHQ, Army, Navy, Airforce	MOD	2010	2015	2020	MOD	Annually	Progressive correspondence between required Structure/Arms and budgeted equipments	Inadequate funding	Provision of adequate funds
Objective 1, Goal 3, Strategy 3, Initiative 2 1-3-3-2	MOD	DHQ, Army, Navy, Airforce, Private sector	MOD, Private sector	2011	-	-	MOD	Quarterly	Submission of Report on Exploration	Uncooperative attitude by technical personnel in the Armed Forces.	Appropriate sensitization.
OBJECTIVE, GOAL, STRATEGY & INITIATIVES	IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 1, Goal 3, Strategy 4, Initiative 1 1-3-4-1	MOD	DHQ, Army.	MOD	2011	2015	-	MOD/DHQ	Bi-annually	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Submission by DHQ to MOD • Progressive budgeting for the establishment of the unit. 	None	None.
Objective 1, Goal 3, Strategy 5,	Presidency	NASS, DHQ	-	2010	-	-	Presidency	-	Non violation of constitutional provision on the	Non compliance by the Executive.	Oversight by NASS



Objective 1, Goal 3, Strategy 10, Initiative 1	Presidency	MOD, DICON, Federal Ministry of Science & Technology, STEYR Nig. Ltd. (Special Vehicle Plant-Bauchi), Other Private Sector Stakeholders.	Presidency/ MOD.	2010	2015	2020	Presidency, MOD	Annually	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increasing evidence of collaboration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Lack of Cooperation between MOD, DICON & Private sector partners. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Political will by the Presidency
Objective 1, Goal 3, Strategy 6, Initiative 1	MOD	MOD, DICON, Federal Ministry of Science & Technology, STEYR Nig. Ltd. (Special Vehicle Plant-Bauchi), Other Private Sector Stakeholders.	MOD	2012	2015	2020	MOD	Annually	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Production of short medium range weapons. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inadequate funding 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of adequate funds.
Objective 1, Goal 3, Strategy 11, Initiative 1	DHQ	MOD/Armed Forces	MOD	2010	2015	2020	MOD	Annually	Observable adherence to training schedule	Inadequate funding	Adequate and timely release of funds
Objective 1, Goal 3, Strategy 7, Initiative 1	Presidency	MOD, DICON, Federal Ministry of Science & Technology, STEYR Nig. Ltd. (Special Vehicle Plant-Bauchi), Other Private Sector Stakeholders, NASS.	None	2010	-	-	MOD	Quarterly	Amendments to DICON Law enacted.	Lack of Cooperation between MOD, DICON & Private sector partners.	Political will by the Presidency.
Objective 1, Goal 3, Strategy 11, Initiative 2	DHQ	MOD, DICON, Federal Ministry of Science & Technology, STEYR Nig. Ltd. (Special Vehicle Plant-Bauchi), Other Private Sector Stakeholders, NASS.	None	2010	2015	2020	DHQ, Army, Navy, Airforce and Security agencies.	Quarterly	Committee constituted and submits report	Lack of Cooperation between MOD, DICON & Private sector partners.	None
Objective 1, Goal 3, Strategy 8, Initiative 1	Presidency	MOD, DICON, Federal Ministry of Science & Technology, STEYR Nig. Ltd. (Special Vehicle Plant-Bauchi), Other Private Sector Stakeholders.	None	2010	2015	2020	MOD	Bi-annually	Increasing evidence of collaboration between DICON and Private Sector Stakeholders.	Lack of Cooperation between MOD, DICON & Private sector partners.	Political will by the Presidency.
OBJECTIVE, GOAL, STRATEGY & INITIATIVES	IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 1, Goal 3, Strategy 9, Initiative 1	Presidency	MOD, DICON, Federal Ministry of Science & Technology, STEYR Nig. Ltd. (Special Vehicle Plant-Bauchi), Other Private Sector Stakeholders.	None	2010	2015	2020	MOD	Bi-annually	Increasing evidence of collaboration between DICON and Private Sector Stakeholders.	Lack of Cooperation between MOD, DICON & Private sector partners.	Political will by the Presidency.



OBJECTIVE 2: To facilitate an efficient, reliable and proactive intelligence gathering system that procures and delivers intelligence in a manner that is timely and accurate.



OBJECTIVE, GOAL, STRATEGY & INITIATIVES	IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 2, Goal 1, Strategy 1, Initiative 1	Presidency	NSA, SSS and NIA	Presidency	2010	-	-	NSA	Quarterly	Constitution of Committee in place	Resistance by Intelligence and Military	Firmness by the President.
Objective 2, Goal 3, Strategy 1, Initiative 1	Presidency	Ministry of Finance, Salaries and Wages Commission, NSA	Presidency	2010	-	-	NSA	Every 3 yrs	Visibly improved performance of the operations	Noticeable rise of rivalry from the tertiary	Disciplinary measures
Objective 2, Goal 2, Strategy 1, Initiative 1	NSA	NSA, SSS and NIA	Presidency	2010	-	-	NSA	Monthly	Existence of criteria for recruitment of the Corps.	Institution of those responsible for the exposure.	Review of any restrictive and preferential treatment of any selected Universities.
Objective 2, Goal 3, Strategy 1, Initiative 1	NSA	Federal Ministry of Justice and NASS.	Presidency	2010	-	-	NSA	Quarterly	Existence of appropriate legislation	Failure to stick to the principle	Appropriate sanctions for those responsible for the exposure.
Objective 2, Goal 2, Strategy 1, Initiative 1	NSA	NSA, SSS and NIA	Presidency	2010	-	-	NSA	Annually	When the Corps is in place	Failure to stick to the principle	NSA to appoint a Committee to make with SSS.
Objective 2, Goal 4, Strategy 1, Initiative 1	NSA, NIA	NARSDA	Presidency	-	2012	-	NSA	Quarterly	Installation of COMSAT	Failure of the equipment to work	Committee to make with SSS.
Objective 2, Goal 3, Strategy 2, Initiative 1	NSA	SAVES, CIPRA and National Boundary Commission.	Presidency	2010	2012	2016	NSA NSA	Quarterly Annually	Production of Collation and submission of requirement	Failure to release of fund	Adequate and prompt release of fund
Objective 2, Goal 4, Strategy 1, Initiative 1	NSA	NIA, SSS	Presidency	-	2012	-	NSA	Quarterly	Existence of collated list of equipment.	Omission of vital equipment on the list leading	A thorough scrutiny of the Enhanced Security.
Objective 2, Goal 2, Strategy 2, Initiative 1	NSA	NSA, SSS, PS SSO and NIA	Presidency	2010	2012	2016	NSA	Annually	When there's no reduction in the budgetary requirement	Poor performance on the list	Enriched Security.
Objective 2, Goal 5, Strategy 1, Initiative 1	NSA	NIA, SSS, NERDC, Civil Society Groups.	Presidency	2010	-	-	NSA	Monthly	Production of the blueprint	Non-involvement of CSO	Involvement of CSOs in the production of blue print.
Objective 2, Goal 3, Strategy 1, Initiative 1	NSA	NSA, SSS and NIA	Presidency	-	-	-	NSA	Annually	Harmonized Curriculum	The failure to	Firmness by the NSA on
Objective 2, Goal 1, Strategy 2, Initiative 1	Presidency	NSA, Ministry of Education, CSO,	Presidency	2010	-	-	NSA, Ministry of Education	Quarterly	Security consciousness by the citizens	Not to utilize the curriculum for training by agencies	Regular monitoring to ensure compliance.



OBJECTIVE, GOAL, STRATEGY & INITIATIVES	IMPLEMENTING AGENCIES	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 2, Goal 6, Strategy 1, Initiative 1 2-6-1-1	NSA	NIA, SSS	Presidency	2010	-	-	NSA	Quarterly	Establishment of National Security Institute	Resentment from the agencies.	NSA to assure the agencies that the Institute will only focus on basic level training and not tactical or operational.
Objective 2, Goal 6, Strategy 2, Initiative 1 2-6-2-1	NSA	SSS, NIA	Presidency	2010	-	-	NSA		Submission and approval of Executive memo to institutionalize inter-service collaboration.	Mutual rivalry among the agencies.	Regular workshops/seminars or lectures to douse the fears.



OBJECTIVE 3: TO EMPLACE AND IMPLEMENT COMPREHENSIVE, SOCIAL-SCIENTIFIC, EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL STRATEGY.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN							IMPLEMENTATION MONITORING TOOL				
GOALS, STRATEGIES and INITIATIVES for OBJECTIVE 3	IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 3, Goal 1, Strategy 1, Initiative 1, 3-1-1-1	Presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NASS Fed. Min. Of Justice; Ministry of Police Affairs Ministry of Interior. 	None	2010	-	-	Presidency	Quarterly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> law enacted; Commission established and commences work 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inter-agency rivalry Lack of effective collaboration 	Emphasis on policy advisory role of the Commission
Objective 3, Goal 2, Strategy 1, Initiative 1, 3-2-1-1	Presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FMOJ Nigeria Police Force Nigeria Prison Service Nigeria Immigration Service. Nigeria Customs Service EFCC 	None	2010	-	-	Presidency	Quarterly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Committee in place Submission of blue print. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inter-agency rivalry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emphasis of social science disposition of blue print



Objective 3, Goal 3, Strategy 3, Initiative 1 3-3-3-1	3-3-3-1	Presidency • Social science professional groups • NASS.	• NPF • Judiciary • NPS		2011	2014		National Commission for Crime Prevention and Control.	Biannually.	• Pool of trained specialised corps in the respective agencies.	Inadequate/untimely funding
GOALS, STRATEGIES and INITIATIVES for OBJECTIVE 3	IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 3, Goal 3, Strategy 1, Initiative 1 3-3-1-1	Presidency	• Ministry of Police Affairs. • Fed. Ministry of Justice • Interior • The Judiciary.	• Supervising ministries and agencies	2010	2013	-	• Supervising Ministries • National Council	Biannually.	• Engagement of consultants • PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI) • Acquisition of required equipment • Publication of	• Resistance from within the agencies • Training and retention	• Sensitisation on the importance of valid crime data • Adequate funding and remuneration.
Objective 3, Goal 4, Strategy 1, Initiative 1 3-4-1-1	Presidency	• Nigeria Law Reform Commission; • NBA; • The Judiciary • FMOJ • NHRC, • NPF	Presidency	2011	2014	-	Presidency	Biannually	• PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI) • Constitution and functioning of technical Committee.	• Inadequate funding • Secretariat problems. • Inadequate/untimely funding	• Adequate provision of Funds • Provision of effective Secretariat
Objective 3, Goal 3, Strategy 2, Initiative 1 3-3-2-1	Presidency	• Nigeria Police Force • Judiciary • Nigeria Prison Service • Social science professional groups and other relevant NGO's.	• NPF, • NPS • Judiciary	2011	2014		National Commission for Crime Prevention and Control.	Biannually.	• Pool of trained specialised corps in the respective agencies.	Inadequate/untimely funding	Timely provision of required funds



Objective 3, Goal 4, Strategy 1, Initiative 2 3-4-1-2	Federal Ministry of Justice.	-	-	-	2015	-	Presidency	Quarterly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Preparation of the Bill. Passage by National Assembly. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delay in preparation of Bill Delay in passage of law by the National Assembly 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Timely preparation of the Bill Timely enactment of the Law;
Objective 3, Goal 4, Strategy 1, Initiative 3 3-4-1-3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National Judicial Institute 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fed. and States Ministries of Justice Federal and State Judiciary Nigeria Police Force Nigeria Bar Association Legal aid Council Human Rights Commission. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Federal and State Governments Foreign Donors. 	-	2015	2020	Judiciary, National Human Rights Commission.	Annually	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Execution of training programmes. Trained Judicial officers fully conversant with revised procedural laws Speedier disposition of cases. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inadequate /untimely funding 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adequate and timely funding
Objective 3, Goal 5, Strategy 1, Initiative 1 3-5-1-1	The Judiciary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fed. Min. of Justice Fed. Min. of Finance Fed. Min. of Works State Govts. 	-	2011	-	-	Federal and State Judiciary	Quarterly	Submission of Audit report	-	-
GOALS, STRATEGIES and INITIATIVES for OBJECTIVE 3	IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 3, Goal 5, Strategy 2, Initiative 1	The Judiciary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fed. Min. of Justice Fed. Min. of Finance Fed. Min. of Works State Govts. 	Federal and State Judiciary	2011	2015	2020	Federal and State Judiciary	Biannually	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Submission of cost implications Progressive construction of new courts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delay in submission of cost implications Inadequate funding Untimely release of Funds 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Timely submission of cost implications. Adequate funding Timely release of funds



Objective 3, Goal 5, Strategy 3, Initiative 1 3-5-3-1	NHRC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Legal Aid Council • Civil Society groups • Fed. Min. Of Justice • Presidency • NASS 	None	2011	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fed. Ministry of Justice 	Quarterly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Submission of proposed amendments • Passage of amendment by NASS 	None	None
Objective 3, Goal 5, Strategy 4, Initiative 1 3-5-4-1	Presidency.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fed. and State Ministries of Justice • Fed. and State Ministries of Youth and Women Affairs • Council of States. 	None	2011	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fed. and State Ministries of Justice • Fed. and States Ministries of Youth and Women Affairs 	Quarterly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Memo to Council of States • Approval by the Council of States 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delay in submission of Memo to Council of States • Non-approval by the Council of States 	Timely submission of Memo and timely approval of Memo
Objective 3, Goal 6, Strategy 1, Initiative 1 3-6-1-1	Police Service Commission (PSC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • NPF • Ministry of Police Affairs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of Police Affairs • Police Service Commission 	2010	2015	2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ministry of Police Affairs 	Biannually	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Production of Test Formats • Progressive implementation of Test Formats for new recruitment/enlistment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Delay in production of Test Formats. • Inefficient application of Test Formats. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Prompt production of test formats • Training of Test Administrators.
GOALS, STRATEGIES and INITIATIVES for OBJECTIVE 3	IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 3, Goal 6, Strategy 1, Initiative 2	Police Service Commission.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Min. Of Police Affairs • NPF. 	None	2010	-	-	Ministry of Police Affairs.	Quarterly	Vetting system in place.	None	None



3-6-1-2											
Objective 3, Goal 6, Strategy 2, Initiative 1 3-6-2-1	NPF.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Police Service Commission Ministry of Police Affairs 	None	2010	-	-	Ministry of Police Affairs.	Quarterly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Production and submission of revised training curriculum Submission of cost implication 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delay in submission of revised training curriculum Delay in submission of cost implication 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Timely submission of revised training curriculum Timely submission of cost implication.
Objective 3, Goal 6, Strategy 3, Initiative 1 3-6-3-1	Police Service Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Min. of Police Affairs Nig. Police Force 	None	2010	-	-	Min. of Police Affairs	Quarterly	Submission of proposal for increase in length of training period and cost implications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delay in submission of details on increase in length of training period and cost implications 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pressure for timely submission of details on length of training period and cost implications
Objective 3, Goal 6, Strategy 4, Initiatives 1 and 2 3-6-4-1/2	Police Service Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Nigeria Police Force Min. of Police Affairs 	Min. of Police Affairs	2010	2015	2020	Min. of Police Affairs	Biannually	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Prod. of Police Handbook and Note book Adequate distribution of same to all members of the ranks and file Evidence of progressive observance of Citizens rights by Police 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inadequate funding Existing Police subculture that is antithetical to Human rights. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adequate and timely funding Firmness by I.G.P and officer cadre.
GOALS, STRATEGIES and	IMPLEMENTING	COLLABORATING	FUNDING	SHORT TERM	MEDIUM TERM	LONG TERM	MONITORING	MONITORING	KEY	RISKS	MITIGATION



INITIATIVES for OBJECTIVE 3	AGENCY	AGENCIES	SOURCES	(2009-2011)	(2012-2015)	(2016-2020)	AGENCIES	FREQUENCY	PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)		
Objective 3, Goal 6, Strategy 5, Initiative 1 3-6-5-1	Nig. Police Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fed. Min. of Police Affairs Police Service Commission 	-	2010	-	-	Ministry of Police Affairs	Quarterly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Submission of Audit report Remediation of insufficiencies 	None	None
Objective 3, Goal 6, Strategy 6, Initiative 1 3-6-6-1	Nig. Police Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fed. Min. of Police Affairs 	None	2010	-	-	Ministry of Police Affairs	Quarterly	Timely preparation of list and cost implications	None	None
Objective 3, Goal 6, Strategy 7, Initiative 1 3-6-7-1	Nig. Police Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fed. Min. of Police Affairs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> None 	2010	-	-	Ministry of Police Affairs	Quarterly	Timely preparation of list of staff strength and cost implication for renovation of offices and barracks	None	None
Objective 3, Goal 6, Strategy 8, Initiative 1 3-6-8-1	Presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fed. Min. of Justice EFCC, ICPC Civil Society Groups. 	None	2010	2015	2020	Civil Society Groups.	Continuous	Conviction of actual offenders irrespective of status.	Lack of Political Will	Pressure from Civil Society Groups.
Objective 3, Goal 6, Strategy 8, Initiative 2 3-6-8-2	Judiciary	FMOJ, NPF & other Operatives of State Security Agencies	Presidency.	2011	2015	2020	Presidency	Biannually	Speedy trial of offenders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Inadequate and untimely funding Inadequate manpower and logistic facilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adequate and timely funding Adequate manpower and logistic facilities.



GOALS, STRATEGIES and INITIATIVES for OBJECTIVE 3	IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 3, Goal 6, Strategy 8, Initiative 3 3-6-8-3	Presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FMOJ, NASS Judiciary EFCC ICPC 	None	2010	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Presidency Civil Society Groups 	Continuous	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Revision of extant law to allow for trial and conviction of offenders at their locality Evidence of trial and conviction of offenders at their locality. Utilization of forfeited assets for benefit of the local communities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resistance by the Political and other elites 	Political Will by the Presidency
Objective 3, Goal 6, Strategy 9, Initiative 1 and 2 3-6-9-1/2	Police Service Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NPF Ministry of Police Affairs. 	Min. of Police Affairs Donor Agencies	2010	2015	2020	Min. of Police Affairs Civil Society Groups.	Biannually	Improved Police-Public interaction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Commitment level of the Police Hierarchy Inadequate funding 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pressure by the Police Service Commission and Civil Society Groups Adequate funding
Objective 3, Goal 7, Strategy 1, Initiative 1 3-7-1-1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> FMOJ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NPS Civil Society Groups. NHRC NASS 	None	2010	-	-	Fed. Ministry of Justice National Human Rights Commission Nigeria Prison Service	Quarterly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Submission of Bill to NASS Passage of Bill by NASS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delay in preparation of Bill for NASS Delay in passage of Bill by NASS 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pressure on FMOJ to prepare bill Pressure on NASS for speedy passage.



GOALS, STRATEGIES and INITIATIVES for OBJECTIVE 3	IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 3, Goal 7, Strategy 2, Initiative 1 3-7-2-1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The Judiciary The NPF 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NBA Civil Society Groups. States Judiciary. 	None.	2010	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> NBA Civil Society Groups. 	Monthly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Preparation of guidelines for bail liberalization Distribution of guidelines to all Police formations and judicial officers nationwide. 	Delay in preparation and circulation of guidelines.	Provision of deadlines for preparation and circulation of guidelines
Objective 3, Goal 7, Strategy 3, Initiative 1 3-7-3-1	Nigeria Prisons Service	Ministry of Interior The Judiciary Presidency.	None	2011	-	-	Ministry of Interior.	Bi-annually	Submission of needs assessment along with cost implication to Govt.	Delay in execution of needs assessment.	Provision of deadline to NPS for submission of needs assessment.
Objective 3, Goal 8, Strategy 1, Initiative 1 3-8-1-1	Presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fed. and State Govts. FMOJ Council of States. 	None	2010	-	-	Presidency	Quarterly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Distribution of funding load among the three tiers of Govt. Improved funding for Prison service. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Resistance by State and LGs to share funding load. Delay in reaching an agreeable MoU on the 	Rational persuasion of State and LGs on the need to share funding load.



GOALS, STRATEGIES and INITIATIVES for OBJECTIVE 3	IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 3, Goal 8, Strategy 2, Initiative 1 3-8-2-1	Nigeria Prisons Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fed Min of Interior Fed. Min. of Justice; Fed. Min. of Educ. Fed. Min of Works and Housing Fed. Min of Health Fed Min of Youths and Sports NHRC Civil Society Groups. 	None	2011	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fed Min of Interior Fed. Min. of Justice, NHRC Civil Society Groups 	Quarterly	Submission on operational deficits.	Delay in executing assessment	Provision of deadline for submission of assessment.
Objective 3, Goal 8, Strategy 3, Initiative 1 and 2 3-8-3-1/2	Nigeria Prisons Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fed. and State Govts. ICRC Federal Min of Interior Federal Min of Works and Housing. Interested private investors 	None	2011	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Federal Min of Interior, ICRC (Infrastructure Concession Regulatory 	Quarterly	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Report on identified physical/infrastructural need across the Federation to determine appropriate areas of lease 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Delay in submission of assessment report Delay in convening meeting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of deadline to NPS for submission of assessment report and convening of meeting. Emphasis on mutual understanding of shared interest



GOALS, STRATEGIES and INITIATIVES for OBJECTIVE 3	IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 3, Goal 8, Strategy 4 Initiative 1 and 2 3-8-4-1/2	Nigeria Prisons Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Federal Min of Interior Federal Min of Justice Civil Society Groups 	None	2010	-	-	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Federal Min of Interior Civil Society Groups 	Quarterly	General improvement in the environment and well being of inmates.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Poor response by the NGOs Lack of cooperation on the part of prison personnel. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encouragement of NGOs to provide assistance. Policy enforcement by Prison leadership
Objective 3, Goal 8, Strategy 5, Initiative 1	Nigeria Prisons Service	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Federal Ministry of Interior Prison board. 	NPS	2011	2015	2020.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Federal Ministry of Interior Prisons Board 	Bi-annually	Improved attitude and behaviour towards prisoners by warders	Resistance to change by the old generation warders	Continuous attitudinal reorientation training.
Objective 3, Goal 9, Strategy 1, Initiative 1	Nigeria Police Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Presidency Min. of Police Affairs Other relevant Intelligence 	Fed., State and Local Govts.	2010	2015	2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Presidency Min. of Police Affairs State 	Monthly.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Reduction in crime rate Increase in apprehension of offenders. 	Lack of adequate Funding	Adequate funding



3-9-1-1		Agencies					Govts. • Local Govts.				
Objective 3, Goal 9, Strategy 2, Initiative 1 & 2 3-9-2-1/2	Nigeria Police Force	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Other Law enforcement agencies Electronic and print media General Public 	Nigeria Police Force	2010	2015	2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ministry of Police Affairs Civil Society Groups 	Monthly	Improved feeling of Security in the general population	None	None
Objective 3, Goal 10, Strategy 1, Initiative 1 3-10-1-1	Presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Min. of Interior National Security and Civil Defence Corps(NSCDC) 	Presidency.	2011	2015	2020	Federal Ministry of Interior	Bi-annually	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of permanent, office and barrack accommodation Enhance performance of the Corps. 	Delay in approval/release of take-off grant from Govt.	Sensitization of the Presidency to the security importance of the work of the Corps.
GOALS, STRATEGIES and INITIATIVES for OBJECTIVE 3	IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 3, Goal 10, Strategy 1, Initiative 2 3-10-1-2	Presidency	Federal Min of Interior NSCDC	Presidency	2011	-	-	Federal Ministry of Interior.	Quarterly	Corps personnel carrying appropriate arms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Opposition by the Nigeria Police Force Delayed of authorisation by the Presidency 	Persistence in convincing the Presidency of the need to carry arms.



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OBJECTIVE 4: TO ENSURE PREPAREDNESS FOR ADEQUATE AND EFFICIENT RESPONSE TO NATURAL AND MAN-MADE DISASTERS.

GOALS, STRATEGIES and INITIATIVES for OBJECTIVE 4	IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective4, Goal 1,	Presidency	NEMA ,Federal Fire Service , DHQ,	Presidency	2010	-	-	Presidency.	Quarterly.	Submission of technical	None	None



Strategy 1, Initiative 1 4-1-1-1		NSCDC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.							committee report on visit.		
Objective 4, Goal 1, Strategy 1, Initiative 2 4-1-1-2	Presidency	NEMA ,Federal Fire Service , DHQ, NSCDC..	Presidency	2010	-	-	Presidency.	Quarterly.	Submission of required Blue Print to Government	None	None
Objective 4, Goal 1, Strategy 1, Initiative 3 4-1-1-3	Presidency	FMOJ,NASS	None	-	2012	-	Presidency	Quarterly.	Submission of NEMA and Federal Fire Service Amendment Bills to NASS.	Delay in passing of Amendment Bills by NASS	Executive pressure on NASS.
Objective 4, Goal 2, Strategy 2, Initiative 1 4-2-2-1	Presidency	FMOJ,NASS	None	-	2012	-	Presidency/ NEMA	Quarterly.	Enactment of 'National Disaster Fund' Bill into law	Delayed passing of law by NASS.	Executive pressure on NASS.
Objective 4, Goal 2, Strategy 2, Initiative 2 4-2-2-2	NEMA and FEDERAL FIRE SERVICE	NASS	None	2010	2012	2020	Presidency	Annually	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Realistic budgeting by Disaster/Fire agencies. Approval of budget proposal by NASS 	Inadequate budget allocation.	Executive and Civil Society pressure on NASS.

OBJECTIVE 5: TO PROVIDE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR THE PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS.

IMPLEMENTING											
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GOALS, STRATEGIES and INITIATIVES for OBJECTIVE 5	AGENCY	COLLABORATING AGENCIES	FUNDING SOURCES	SHORT TERM (2009-2011)	MEDIUM TERM (2012-2015)	LONG TERM (2016-2020)	MONITORING AGENCIES	MONITORING FREQUENCY	KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS (KPI)	RISKS	MITIGATION
Objective 5, Goal 1, Strategy 1, Initiative 1 5-1-1-1	Presidency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presidency • Institute for peace and Conflict Resolution 	-	2010	-	-	Presidency	Quarterly	Creation of Peace and Conflict Resolution Commission	-	-